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A series of studies on liquidity management have appeared during the financial crisis, many of 
them comparing the funding liquidity with the market liquidity. The paper offers a dynamic image 
about the liquidity in the Romanian banking sector and its integration with the market risk, 
comparing the Value at Risk approach with the Liquidity at Risk approach. The research also 
wants to highlight the most significant features to consider in order to implement an effective 
liquidity risk management and to achieve a more integrated supervisory framework. 
 
Key words: liquidity risk, market crisis, liquidity limits, Value at Risk, Liquidity at Risk 
 
JEL code: G01, G21, G32, C63. 
 
1.Introduction 
This paper analyze market risk behavior in periods characterized by extreme events and propose 
a liquidity model in order to quantify and manage the risk that arise from the trading book. The 
most used model for quantifying the market risk is Value at Risk (VaR) initiated by Jorion 
(1997), Dowd (1998), and Saunders (1999). Even though it replaced less standardized techniques 
such  as  Asset  and  Liability  Management  and  Stress-testing,  it  lacks  a  rigorous  treatment  of 
liquidity risk. The liquidity risk has two main parts: funding liquidity risk and market liquidity 
risk. The first one has received the most attention from the banks for its significance. But, the 
market liquidity risk, described as the risk that a bank cannot easily offset or eliminate a position 
without significantly affecting the market price because of inadequate market depth or market 
disruption (ECB, 2002) has gained more attention in the latest years.  
A problem of the VaR models is that they don’t take account of market liquidity risk, because 
they  assume  that  the  positions  (currency  rates,  interest  rates,  stock  index  values,  option 
volatilities) could be sold at a fixed market place, the midpoint quote, within a fixed period time 
(Laorence and Robinson, 1995). There are many studies in the related literature of incorporating 
market liquidity risk n the VaR models. Almgren and Chriss (2000) and Bangia et al (1999) 
proposed a dependent model strategy. Dubil (2001) proposed a model for determining optimal 
liquidation  periods  for  different  assets.  Shamroukh  (2000)  highlight  that  scaling  the  holding 
period to  account for  orderly  liquidation  can  only  be justified  if  the  holding  period actually 
represents the liquidation period. Jarrow and Subramanian (1997) proposed a liquidity adjusted 
VaR  measure that incorporates the  liquidity  discount,  volatility  of liquidity  discount  and  the 
volatility of time horizon to liquidation, considering the effect of trade size and execution lag on 
the liquidation value of the portfolio. 
In this article we present a framework for incorporating the liquidity risk into the VaR models. 
Section 2 presents the Value at Risk methodology, in accordance with the Basel II requirements. 
Section 3 describes the Liquidity at Risk methodology and reviews the techniques used to model 
the distribution of the returns. In section 4 is presented a case study which models the daily bid-
ask spread for three important banks from the Romanian banking system, listed on the Bucharest 





2.The Value at Risk methodology 
Financial institutions have developed models for quantifying, comparing and aggregating the risk 
connected with different positions and portfolios. One of the most used methods is Value at Risk, 
which is defined as the expected maximum loss of a portfolio over some time period and for 
some level of probability. From a statistical point of view, VaR entails the estimation of the 
quantile of the returns’ distribution. In other words, Value at Risk is the probability that returns or 
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In order to compute the VaR for a portfolio first we have to mark-to-market the portfolio and then 
to  estimate  the  distribution  of  the  portfolio’s  returns,  which  is  a  very  challenging  statistical 
problem. When the returns are normal, which is very rarely in practice, it is used the variance-
covariance approach. When risk is recurrent VaR can be estimated by using historical time series 
and for new situations it should be modeled through EWMA and GARCH models. When risk is 
sensitive to rare events it is preferred the Extreme Value Theory. The main limitation of the VaR 
methodology is that the assumption of normal distribution can lead to large underestimation of 
the probability of extreme events, which affects the capital requirements. Also, the estimated 
distribution tends to fit central observations, while falling in fitting the extreme observations. The 
accuracy of VaR depends on how well the underlying markets have been simulated and how well 
each  security  has  been  modeled.  Recent  studies  propose  to  analyze  only  the  distribution  of 
extreme returns, instead of describing the behavior of all of the returns (Ferreira and Lopez, 2004; 
Burns, 2002; Rombouts and Verbeek, 2004). Related to these studies is the EVT, introduced in 
finance by Embrechts (1997), although the basics were initiated by Fisher and Tippett (1928) 
when  proposing  the  Generalized  Extreme  Value  (GEV)  distribution.  The  modeling  of  the 
financial variables through EVT was also studied by McNeil and Frail (2000), by Danielsson and 
De  Vries  (1997)  which  computed  a  model  for  calculating  the  VaR,  taking  into  account  the 
inconsistency of extreme values and by Huisman et al. (1997) which proposed a new estimator 
for the tail index. 
 
3.The Liquidity at Risk methodology 
Banks should possess a funding liquidity contingency plan in order to prevent insolvency, pass 
through stressful situations and maintain their reputation and credit rating. From all the proposed 
definitions of funding liquidity and market liquidity the next two ones are promising. Funding 
liquidity is the ability of a bank to maintain a prospective equilibrium between cash inflows and 
outflows, ensuring appropriate coverage of payments on the bank’s liabilities (Erzegovesi, 2002). 
Market  liquidity  is  the  discounted  expected  price  concession  required  for  an  immediate 
transformation  of  an  asset  into  cash  or  cash  into  an  asset  under  a  specific  trading  strategy 
(Neuman and Demsetz, 1968). Jarrow and Subramanian (1997) consider the effect of trade size 
and execution lag on the liquidation value of the portfolio, proposing a liquidity adjusted VaR 
that incorporates the volatility of liquidity discount. 
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In order to incorporate the liquidity risk into the VaR models we would make an assumption that 
in stressed market conditions extreme events in returns and extreme events in spreads happen 
concurrently. So, in calculating liquidity-risk adjusted VaR we incorporate both a 99
th percentile 
movement in the underlying and a 99
th percentile movement in the spread: 
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Assuming that the expected return E(rt) is zero, that the Liquidity at Risk can be written as 
follows: 
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where  T S  is the relative medium spread ((Ask-Bid)/Mid) over the time horizon T,  s ~  is the 
volatility of the medium spread and a is the scaling factor, a multiple of the spread volatility, in 
order to achieve 99% probability coverage and θ is a correction factor that take into account the 
fat-tailed distribution. 
 
4.Empirical study: analyzing the market risk and the liquidity risk in the Romanian banking 
system 
In order do determine the VaR and the LaR we have modeled the daily data of the stock prices 
for three important banks in the Romanian banking system, listed on the stock exchange: Erste 
Bank  (EBS),  BRD  Group  Societe  Generale  (BRD)  and  Transilvania  Bank  (TLV),  from 
01.01.2007 to 31.03.2010. The observations of the closing price, bid and ask spread, are available 
on a period longer than that we took in consideration, but we have considered that the recent 
observations provides a better estimation on the risk of the portfolio. Also, we divided the data 
into two samples: the first sample is from 01.01.2007 to 31.08.2009 representing the “pre crisis” 
period and the second sample is from 01.09.2009 to 31.03.2010 representing the “post crisis” 
period. 
The daily rentabilities were determined by logarithmation of the series of closing prices and 
present a lot of extreme variations that took place on the stock exchange market. Applying the 
Jarque Berra Test we will observe that the normal hypothesis is rejected. The distributions are 
leptokurtic, more sharpen than the normal ones, for all of the samples, a fact shown by the 
kurtosis coefficient. Analyzing the skewness coefficient we will observe that the distributions are 
shifted to the left, compared with the normal distribution. Applying the ADF and the Philipe-
Peron tests it will be observed that the series composed of the closing prices values have one unit 
roots, which means that it is needed a first order differentiation in order to become stationary.  
 
Table 1: The moments of the distributions  












Observations  265  323  403  323  403  323 
Mean    -0.000359  -0.000202  -0.000136  -0.000241  -0.001671   0.001543 
Median   0.000080   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000 
Maximum   0.051403   00.51403   0.113482   0.139762   0.062160   1.434721 
Minimum  -0.369786  -0.468803  -0.099820  -0.158523  -0.501279  -0.501279 
Std. Dev.     0.037123   0.060703   0.017438   0.027437   0.025827   0.060477 
Skewness   -0.975164   -0.784071  -0.057078  -0.565357  -11.15595   17.00904 
Kurtosis   98.41873   54.69923   9.606578   11.33078   200.8467   427.6909 
Jarque-Bera   342687.5   30483.70   1366.191  2211.710   1240438   5680052 
Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 446 
 
 
According  to  all  these  factors,  the  distribution  of  the  rentabilities  presents  fat  tails,  which 
correspond to the extreme variations that took place on the money market. Using the historical 
simulation method can lead to an overestimation of VaR, especially that the method describes the 
maximum  expected  loss.  Here  appears  the  “volatility  clustering”  phenomena,  which  can  be 
remedied by the heteroscedasticity models GARCH. 
In order to eliminate the linear structure we propose some ARMA models studying the residuals’ 
correlogram, for which the AIC and BIC criterions are minimum. In the pre-crisis period we 
found ARMA(7) for EBS, ARMA(3) for BRD and ARMA(4) for TLV and in the  post-crisis 
period we found ARMA(5) for EBS, ARMA(6) for BRD and ARMA(7) for TLV. The remained 
residuals have a non-linear structure which was detected by the BDS test elaborated in 1987 by 
Brock, Dechert and Scheinkman, in order to check the stochastic non-linearity. The BDS test’s 
values are strong, which sustains the rejection of the normal hypothesis. This tendency reflects a 
degree of heteroscedasticity, which means that the present volatility depends on the previous 
volatility. Unless the data is filtered, this dependence will undermine the value of VaR. In order 
to eliminate the correlation between residuals we had to find some GARCH models. The best 
models identified were: GARCH(2,3) for EBS, TGARCH for BRD, GARCH(2,4) for TLV in the 
pre-crisis period and GARCH(1,2) for EBS, GARCH(2,3) for BRD, GARCH(3,4) for TLV in the 
post-crisis period. 
In order to calculate the banks’ exposure to liquidity and market risk, we have incorporated the 
liquidity components into the VaR approach. It is observed that during the financial crisis the 
liquidity component has a higher contribution in the level of VaR. The results for the two samples 
taken into consideration are the following: 
 
Table 2: Market and liquidity risk for the pre-crisis period 
  EBS  BRD  TLV 
Price on 31.08.2009  144.10  12.5  0.288 
Return volatility ( t s )  0.037123  0.060703  0.017438 
Fat tail factor (θ)  1.2  1.3  1.25 
Market component (VaR) 
( )
) 33 . 2 ( 1
t e P t
qs - - ×   4.3796  2.5634  0.0937 
Liquidity component of (LaR) 
( ) [ ] s ~
2
1
a S P t +   0.0816  0.1043  0.0034 
Total Adjusted Value at Risk  4.4612  2.6677  0.0971 
% of liquidity component  1.8291%  3.9097%  3.5015% 
 
Table3: Market and liquidity risk for the post-crisis period 
  EBS  BRD  TLV 
Price on 31.03.2010  125.10  15.6  2.31 
Return volatility ( t s )  0.027437  0.025827  0.060477 
Fat tail factor (θ)  1.4  1.65  1.55 
Market component (VaR) 
( )
) 33 . 2 ( 1
t e P t
qs - - ×   4.9872  3.0105  0.1032 
Liquidity component of (LaR) 
( ) [ ] s ~
2
1
a S P t +   0.1207  0.2032  0.0048 447 
 
Total Adjusted Value at Risk  5.1079  3.2137  0.108 
% of liquidity component  2.3630%  6.3229%  4.4444% 
 
In  order  to  test  the  post  efficiency  of  the  methodologies  we  have  used  the  back-testing,  by 
simulating the stress scenarios for the least 245 days. We have applied the quadratic loss function 
approach, calculating how many times the VaR has been exceeded. The results are presented 
below: 
 
Table 4: Backtesting results for the market portfolio with and without liquidity risk 
  Pre-crisis  Post-crisis 
Exceptions from of 
VaR99% 
Market risk  Market risk & 
Liquidity risk  Market risk  Market risk & 
Liquidity risk 
EBS  4  3  6  4 
BRD  6  4  6  4 
TLV  5  2  5  3 
 
The  best  methods,  which  are  in  the  minimum  risk  zone  (which  means  that  VaR  has  been 
exceeded for no more that 4 times), are those that take into consideration the market liquidity 
risk. The other models that count only the bank’s exposure to the market risk are in the medium 
safety zone (from 5 to 9 violations of VaR), which means that the banks need more capital 
allocation in order to satisfy the Basel II Accord requirements. 
 
5.Conclusion 
We confirmed our hypothesis that only advanced VaR models that incorporate the liquidity risk 
(LaR)  could adequately  measure  exposure  of the  bank  to  market  risk  and  satisfy  the  BCBS 
criteria in periods characterized by extreme events. Also, in forecasting VaR for exposures in 
crisis periods it should be used a shorter sample of data, the most recent one, in order to capture 
the  large  movements  on  the  market.  With  regard  to  accuracy,  the  risk  managers  should  be 
concerned with whether the model’s ex-post performance is compatible with the theoretically 
desired level, applying permanently back-testing criteria. 
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